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In his provocative discussion, Matthew argues that the rich content view 
doesn’t matter to other debates in philosophy. I am sympathetic with much 
of what he said. But I do have three points to add.  
 
1.	  The	  Rich	  Content	  View	  Not	  Needed	  to	  Answer	  Skepticism:	  A	  Quicker	  Argument?	  
 
To begin with, I agree with Mathew’s claim that it is not obviously the case 
that “the rich content view plays a critical role in our avoiding skepticism 
about the external world”, as he puts it. His argument is that there are ac-
counts of perceptual justification that do not require the rich content view, 
and one of those accounts might be right.  
The first point I’d like to make is that Matthew might have said some-
thing even stronger. One of these accounts must be right: there must be a 
true account of perceptual justification that does not require that rich con-
tent view.  
To see this, notice that, even if the rich content view is true in the actual 
world, there are possible worlds in which it is false. For the sake of argument, 
suppose that, in the actual world, the content of your experience of toma-
toes is rich. Now consider another possible world, W, in which, owing to 
some neural differences, your experiences of tomatoes fail represent one spe-
cific high-level property that they represent in the actual world – say, the 
natural kind property of being of being a tomato, the affordance property of 
being edible, or some causal property. However, suppose that in W every-
thing is otherwise as similar to the actual world as possible: your experiences 
of tomatoes and their lower-level contents and your learning-history and so 
on are as similar as possible to how they are in the actual world.  
Now, intuitively, in such a world W, as well as in the actual world, when 
you see a tomato in a normal case, you wouldn’t only have a justification for 
believing the low-level content that a red and round thing is present; you 
would have a justification for believing, in fact you would know, various 
high-level contents: that a tomato is there, that is edible, that it is causally 
independent of you, and so on. Here as elsewhere, radical skepticism is im-
plausible.  
Because W is a possible world, we know that there must be some or oth-
er true general account of justification according to which you have justifica-
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tion for believing these high-level contents even if the rich content view of 
experience is false. We may not know what that account is - maybe it is a 
reliability-based account, or Millar’s recognitional-capacity account, or a 
permissive dogmatist account, or an inferentialist account based on implicit 
background beliefs. But, because W is a possible world, we know that there 
must be some such true account. (In Pautz 2013a I use a similar argumenta-
tive strategy, involving “absent cognitive qualia worlds”, to argue against 
claims about the epistemic significance of cognitive qualia.) 
 
2.	  Could	  the	  Rich	  Content	  View	  Help	  in	  Selecting	  A	  Theory	  of	  Sensory	  Representation?	  	  
 
So much, then, for the first of my three points. The second point I’d like to 
make is this. I agree with Matthew that the significance of the rich content 
view has been overplayed. But I think that if certain versions of it are true – I 
don’t myself think they are true, but if they are true – then this might help 
naturalists about representation select between different naturalistic theories 
of sensory representation – a possibility Matthew didn’t consider.  
To see this, pretend that some strong version of the rich content view is 
true: your visual experience of a tomato represents, not only that it is red 
and round, but also that it is a tomato, that it is edible, and that it is causally 
independent of you. Let N be the neural realizer of your experience.  
Arguably, such a rich view would rule out a general causal-covariation 
theory of sensory representation of the kind defended by Tye, Stalnaker, and 
Neander. For, intuitively, the tokening of the neural state N in the visual sys-
tem (as the result of light) on particular occasions is never causally explained 
by a tomato’s having the very high-level properties of being a real tomato, or 
being edible, or being causally independent of you. For instance, the visual 
system is just not causally sensitive to the edibility of a tomato, or even its 
being a tomato. A fake tomato with the same low-level properties would 
have led to the receptor activity and downstream processing.1  
By contrast, at least in some cases, the rich content view might go well 
with, and thereby lend some support for, a more teleological, output-based 
theory, such as Millikan’s success-based theory. For instance, the edibility of a 
fruit might best explain why, in the past, it was advantageous that a certain 
sensory typically caused eating behavior, leading to the proliferation of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Siegel 2010, p. 84ff argues that the causal-covariation theories don’t deliver 
clear verdicts on these matters. I disagree with her arguments, but I cannot 
discuss this here.  
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system in the population.2 So, in some cases, Millikan’s theory might sup-
port the assignment of the high-level content that stuff is edible. (But, I think 
no existing naturalistic theory of sensory representation – including a Milli-
kan-style theory - supports the assignment of high-level causal-counterfactual 
contents, such as that object is causally-counterfactually independent of me.)  
 
3.	  Could	  the	  Rich	  Content	  View	  Help	  Save	  Intentionalism	  from	  Counterexamples?	  
 
My third and final comment is this.  
Roughly, intentionalism about phenomenal consciousness is the view 
that having an experience with a certain phenomenal character just is a mat-
ter sensorily representing a certain content. So, on this view, all phenomenal 
differences require content differences. I agree with Matthew that the rich 
content view is not needed to defend intentionalism in the face of cases of 
unilateral neglect (see also Masrour 2011).  
But some have argued that the rich content view is needed to save inten-
tionalism from certain other alleged counterexamples (the cases below are 
from Pautz 2010).  
For instance, consider intentionalism about pain phenomenology. Imag-
ine a case in which two creatures, from different species, track the same type 
of bodily damage, say a lesion in the arm. But suppose that, for whatever 
reason (e. g. susceptibility to infection), this same lesion is more dangerous 
to one of the creatures than to the other, so the two creatures respond to it 
with radically different neural processing and behaviors. On some elabora-
tions of this case, given what we know from empirical research about the 
neural basis of pain, it is reasonable to think that the two creatures have 
phenomenally different pains. But given that their experiences track the 
same external, physical properties, it is somewhat hard to see what the dif-
ference in representational content might be. This kind of case is especially 
difficult for externalist-realist intentionalists about pain like Tye and Hill.  
In response, Brian Cutter, Michael Tye (2011) and Chris Hill (2012. p. 
137) have claimed that, while the two individuals’ pain experiences repre-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For the point that Millikan’s consumerist theory, but not the causal-
covariation theory, goes naturally with assignments high-level contents like 
being edible frog food, being nutritious, being a dog, see Neander 2012, sections 
3.2 and 3.5; Lycan 1996, pp. 147-8; and Pautz 2010, 50-51. Cutter and Tye 
(2011) have recently argued that in some cases Tye’s own causal covariation 
theory does in fact support assignments of fairly high-level contents like be-
ing potentially dangerous (more on this below), but Pautz 2013, footnote 14 
argues against this. 
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sent the same type of lesion, they also represent that lesion as having differ-
ent subject-indexed valuational properties, of the form being harmful to one to a 
specific degree. This explains the phenomenal difference, according to them. 
So the content of pain experience is richer than you might have thought.  
Some proponents of the rich content view, for instance Nanay and 
Prosser, have argued that visual experiences represent tomatoes and other 
visible objects as having various different affordances, like being edible and 
throw-able. The idea defended by Tye and Hill that pain experiences repre-
sent valuational properties is somewhat analogous, since valuational proper-
ties, like affordances, concern an item’s impact on a creatures’ goal-directed 
behavior.  
Here is another case. Suppose two creatures’ taste systems track the same 
chemical property of the some berries, but the berries are poisonous to one 
of the creatures but an important food-source for the other, so that they re-
spond to it with relevantly different taste processing and behavior. There is 
an empirical argument (which I will not elaborate here) for supposing their 
experiences of the berries to be phenomenally different. But what’s the dif-
ference in representational content? Again, this is especially a problem for 
realist-externalist versions of intentionalism.  
The intentionalist might reply by invoking affordances: there is a phe-
nomenal difference because one creature’s taste experience represents the 
berries as being edible while the other’s taste experience represent them as 
being poisonous. This is a rich content view about taste experience.  
Prosser (2011) has even argued that, to handle certain structurally similar 
cases involving spatial perception, the intentionalist must claim that our 
spatial experiences represent complex affordances in addition to spatial 
properties, such as being easily within reach (although Prosser’s case, and his 
account of what these properties are and his naturalistic theory of how the 
visual system represents them, are somewhat unclear to me).  
Now, as it happens, I think that the aforementioned “rich content ac-
counts” of these cases involving pain and taste face serious problems (Pautz 
2010: 51-2; Pautz 2013: 57-60) and that there is a better alternative available 
to intentionalists: an internalist and projectivist version of intentionalism 
about pain and taste experience (Pautz 2010; Chalmers). (Another alternative 
is the appearance property theory of Shoemaker, Kriegel and others – but I 
think it is problematic (Pautz 2010: 52; 2013: 69-72).)3   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In fact, I think that the rich content view is not well motivated and faces 
general problems (and if it is false, it of course doesn’t matter to other de-
bates). The natural kind thesis – that some experiences represent natural 
kinds - is especially poorly motivated, since we know that that account is not 
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My point is just that we may need to look at more cases, besides the sin-
gle case of unilateral neglect that Matthew considers, before we can conclude 
that the rich content view does not matter to the defense of intentionalism, 
or to the defense of certain realist-externalist versions of intentionalism.  
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needed to account for perceptual phenomenology in possible worlds in 
which what we call “tomatoes” and “pine-trees” and so on don’t fall into 
any natural kinds at all – worlds in which they have no hidden-essence, or in 
fact fall into multiple kinds, or are unreal objects as in a brain-in-a-vat case. 
And there is a general problem with all version of the rich content view: if 
rich content view is true, and the sensory representation high level proper-
ties is an additional level of representation beyond the representation of low 
level properties, then the sensory representation of any high-level property 
[e. g. being happy] should be combinable with the sensory representation of 
any cluster of low-level properties – colors, shapes, orientations (in the same 
way that the representation of any color could go with the representation of 
any shape). For instance, you could represent a pile of mud as happy, an af-
ter-image as causally-independent of you, a lemon as a tomato, and so on. 
This seems absurd. If, on the other hand, the rich content theorist says that 
these are not possibilities, then she owes us an explanation of why they are 
impossible. (I should say, however, that all intentionalists face a problem in 
the vicinity, which I have elsewhere called “the problem of the laws of ap-
pearance”; my point here is that the rich content view would seriously exac-
erbate this problem.) The problem here for the rich content view is analo-
gous to problem involving “separation cases” that I raise elsewhere (Pautz 
2013) for the hypothesis that there is a rich set of cognitive qualia distinct 
from sensory-perceptual qualia.  
   A clarification: I only think the rich content view is false when it is ex-
plained by tying it to an intentionalist theory and using the Lewis-Ramsey 
technique along the lines of Pautz 2009 (for a similar approach to precisify-
ing philosophical debates, see Dorr and Hawthorne forthcoming). If it is ex-
plained in some other, more standard ways, I believe that it is either trivially 
true, or else indeterminate (a claim also recently made by Logue 2013 on 
quite different grounds).  
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